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ABSTRACT
It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in 
Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second 
Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set 
out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III 
rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as 
the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal 
in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.
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1. Introduction
There is little consensus among scholars over how to interpret Kant’s deduc-
tions of morality and freedom in his mature ethics – with one striking excep-
tion. Nearly every commentator believes that Kant rejected his argument from 
Groundwork III (1785) soon after its publication.1 Aside from their disagreements, 
scholars have come to unite on this basic point of interpretation.2
The topic of this paper is whether or not this interpretation is true. Despite the 
fact that Kant never acknowledged a change in the structure of his arguments, 
the standard view in the literature is that his doctrine of the ‘Fact of Reason’ 
from the second Critique (1788) marks a turn in his thinking. For rather than 
establish our freedom independently – either on the grounds that we must 
engage in deliberation or on the grounds that theoretical reason is self-active 
within us – Kant now treats our consciousness of the moral law’s authority as an 
inexplicable ‘fact,’ one that admits of no deduction but that secures the reality of 
freedom in beings ‘who cognize this law as binding upon them’ (KpV, AA 5:47).3 
In an unexpected move, Kant appears to reverse his strategy of justification, 
working from freedom to morality in 1785 and then from morality to freedom 
in 1788.4 In what follows, I will argue that this widely accepted reading of Kant’s 
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deductions, what we may call the Reversal Reading, is mistaken. In its place, I 
will defend a Continuity Reading.5
Admittedly, there is only so much I can hope to accomplish in the following 
pages. What I plan to offer is a sketch of an alternative interpretation, the details 
of which would take us well beyond the scope of a single paper. I say this now 
in order to forestall worries readers might have about the completeness of my 
proposal. As much as I will try to cover all the key points of dispute over the 
relationship between Groundwork III and the second Critique, the fact remains 
that we lack sufficient space to satisfy every point of interest. My aim is not so 
much to settle the dispute once and for all, but to make the Continuity Reading 
a plausible (though perhaps unorthodox) candidate for understanding Kant’s 
project of moral justification. I shall be content, then, merely to shift the bur-
den of proof: by the end of this paper, I hope it is clear that proponents of the 
Reversal Reading must defend, rather than assume, the truth of their position. 
Whatever the outcome, I believe the current literature stands in need of such 
re-examination.
I begin (in Section 2) by reviewing the early reception of Kant’s ethics in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A curious historical point 
is that Kant’s first interpreters saw no fundamental difference between the 
proof-structure of Groundwork III and the second Critique. In fact, the Reversal 
Reading did not acquire uniform shape in the literature until 1960, the year 
Dieter Henrich and Lewis White Beck published their studies on Kant’s project 
of justification in ethics. With this background in place, I turn attention to the 
details of Groundwork III itself (in Section 3), showing that contemporary readers 
have found the Reversal Reading attractive because it purports to explain Kant’s 
worry about a ‘hidden circle.’ I then proceed to outline an alternative reading of 
this circle, one that is consistent with Kant’s argument from morality to freedom 
in the second Critique. My full defense of the Continuity Reading comes next (in 
Section 4), and I devote a further section to answering potential objections to 
it (in Section 5). Then, after explaining why Kant’s two works still differ in their 
presentation (in Section 6), I close by briefly considering what we can learn from 
Kant’s project of justification today (in Section 7).
2. Historical background
Those familiar with the current literature will no doubt be surprised to learn that 
Kant’s first interpreters saw no change in his mature ethical works. In the decades 
to follow the publication of the second Critique, commentators embraced the 
doctrine of the ‘Fact of Reason’ (Faktum der Vernunft) as a paradigm for phil-
osophical inquiry, not only in the domain of morality, but also – more con-
troversially – in the domain of knowledge. As early as 1786/87, Karl Reinhold, 
a devoted advocate of Kant’s philosophy, introduced the concept of ‘facts of 
consciousness’6 (Tatsachen des Bewußtseins) – a phrase that was quickly picked 
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up by Johannes Gottlieb Fichte in his formulation of a ‘science of knowledge’ 
(1794/95). Neither of these authors spoke of Kant’s ‘Faktum’ as a novel develop-
ment within his system of ethics. Nor was this unusual for the time. In his book-
length commentary on the second Critique (1796–97), for example, Christian 
Friedrich Michaelis discussed why our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact’ 
(in the sense of a Tatsache) that admits of no further proof, a point he contrasted 
more than once to Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories in the 
first Critique.7 In this two-volume work, amounting to over 600 pages in length, 
Michaelis only mentioned Kant’s Groundwork five times, and each time he did 
so without reference to the Fact of Reason.8
This is not to say Kant’s arguments from Groundwork III and the second 
Critique won the immediate approval of his contemporaries. Many interpreters 
of these books were of a critical bent.9 Yet what is interesting is that none of these 
early writers even suggested that Kant’s later doctrine of the Fact of Reason 
marked a change, let alone a reversal, in his project of justification. Looking at 
them now, one gets the impression that commentators were either uninter-
ested in the question of Kant’s intellectual development from 1785 to 1788, or 
they were willing to accept his word that the second Critique ‘presupposes’ the 
Groundwork (KpV, AA 5:8). Indeed, this is how Georg Albert Mellin organized the 
relationship between these texts in his monumental Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Critical Philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century. After summarizing the 
three sections of the Groundwork, Mellin paraphrased Kant’s remark that the 
second Critique presupposes the Groundwork insofar as it ‘constitutes prelimi-
nary acquaintance with the principle of duty and provides and justifies a deter-
minate formula of it’ (KpV, AA 5:8).10 Like Reinhold, Fichte, and Michaelis before 
him, Mellin also spoke of the Fact of Reason as a kind of Tatsache without ever 
mentioning Kant’s earlier deductions. Not a single sentence in the Encyclopedic 
Dictionary’s six volumes hinted at anything like a rupture between Groundwork 
III and the second Critique.
All of this stands in sharp contrast to the Reversal Reading popular today. So 
we must ask: When did commentators come to believe that Kant’s project of 
justification underwent a turn? The answer is elusive in part because attitudes 
toward Kantian philosophy in the early nineteenth century were inconsistent. 
Not everyone was as enthusiastic as Reinhold and Fichte, for instance. Still, what 
we can say for certain is that by the early 1800s, 20 years after the publication 
of the second Critique, the positive reception of Kant’s ethics was on the wane. 
There was a growing cynicism among scholars of the time, not only toward the 
system of Kantian philosophy, but also toward the specific doctrine Kant’s early 
advocates cherished: the doctrine of the Fact of Reason. In his book On the Spirit 
of Philosophy (1803), for example, Jakob Salat complained that Kant’s appeal 
to a Faktum reduced the foundations of his practical philosophy to ‘mysticism’ 
– anticipating Hegel’s famous remark that ‘cold duty is the final undigested 
lump left within the stomach, the revelation given to reason.’11 If there was a 
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shared sentiment among scholars, it was that the doctrine of the Fact of Reason 
committed a gross error, although there was no consensus at the time over the 
exact nature of this error.
Surprisingly, the Reversal Reading did not acquire uniform shape in the lit-
erature until 1960, the year Dieter Henrich published his essay, ‘Der Begriff der 
sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft,’12 and Lewis White 
Beck published his book, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. 
Each author reached the same verdict on Kant’s deductions. As Beck put it, the 
argument of the second Critique ‘takes a truly astonishing turn’ (1960, 173). By 
having said ‘that the principle [of morality] needs no deduction, he apparently 
stands the argument of the Groundwork on its head. He uses the moral law, the 
Fact of Reason, as the prius to deduce something else, namely, freedom, which 
is its ratio essendi’ (1960, 172).13 Henrich went further to explain the cause of 
this apparent reversal, suggesting that the argument of the Groundwork was 
still driven by Kant’s pre-critical project of deriving morality from theoretical 
reason. ‘The difference in the structure of the Groundwork and the Critique of 
Practical Reason can be understood,’ he wrote, ‘only if we realize that Kant did not 
yet see clearly in the Groundwork that a deductive justification of ethics must 
necessarily turn out to be unsatisfactory and contradictory.’14 What is strange, 
given the reception of Kant’s ethics I have just reviewed, is that the opinion 
Beck and Henrich expressed has gone largely unchallenged by scholars over 
the last 50 years.15
3. The argument of Groundwork III
I believe many contemporary readers have found the Reversal Reading attractive 
because it purports to explain Kant’s worry about a ‘hidden circle’ (geheimer 
Zirkel) in Groundwork III. In what follows, I will outline an alternative reading of 
this circle, one that is consistent with Kant’s argument from morality to freedom 
in the second Critique (Section 3.1).16 I will then argue that Kant’s concept of 
an ‘intelligible world’ (intelligiblen Welt) provides the key to his deduction of 
freedom, but only if we interpret this concept as a moral ideal (Section 3.2). As 
we shall see, one virtue of this reading is that it makes sense of Kant’s opening 
remark in Groundwork III that he plans to offer a ‘deduction of the concept of 
freedom from pure practical reason, and with it the possibility of a categorical 
imperative’ (GMS, AA 4:447; my emphasis).17
3.1. A ‘hidden circle’
Kant’s worry about a circle in Groundwork III is a bit mystifying, since he says 
little to clarify what the problem amounts to. At first, all he says is that ‘one 
must freely confess that a kind of circle appears here from which, as it seems, 
there is no way out’ (GMS, AA 4:450). Now if we assume that the threat of a 
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circle emerges from using a moral premise to establish our freedom, then we 
can agree that our only means to escape the circle would be to find non-moral 
evidence for thinking we are free. On this assumption, it would be natural to hear 
Kant’s remarks in the second Critique as departing from his earlier approach, as 
when he says that the moral law, while admitting of no deduction, ‘conversely 
itself serves as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty,’ that is, 
the ‘faculty of freedom’ (KpV, AA 5:47). Yet the naturalness of this reading rests 
on how we characterize Kant’s worry in Groundwork III. If the threat of a circle 
does not come from using a moral premise to establish our freedom, then it 
is far from obvious that our only means of escape is to find a non-moral route.
Let us consider what Kant says more closely:
One must freely confess that a kind of circle appears here from which, as it seems, 
there is no way out. We take ourselves as free in the order of efficient causes in 
order to think of ourselves under moral laws in the order of ends, and we after-
wards think of ourselves as subject to these laws because we have attributed to 
ourselves freedom of will. (GMS, AA 4:450)
Upon reading this, it seems Kant is saying that a circle arises if we proceed from 
a moral starting point – for example, if we consider ourselves under moral laws 
in the order of ends. Consequently, it is tempting to think that our only hope to 
escape the circle lies in finding a non-moral premise, one that would establish 
the validity of moral laws without begging the question. While the content of 
this premise is a topic of much controversy, the majority of scholars agree that 
Kant’s argument has this proof-structure. They believe we should find non-moral 
evidence for thinking we are free, either on the grounds that we must engage 
in deliberation or on the grounds that theoretical reason is self-active within 
us (see Section 5.2 below).
While tempting, I find this familiar characterization of Kant’s worry problem-
atic. When we look at how he describes the circle, it is by no means clear that 
our only hope of escape lies in finding a non-moral route. As we read further, 
Kant suggests that our only hope of escape lies in finding a non-analytic or 
‘synthetic’ route. Consider what he says, for instance, in the remainder of the 
passage quoted above:
[F]reedom and the will’s own lawgiving are both autonomy, hence reciprocal con-
cepts, yet for this very reason one cannot be used to explain the other or to specify 
its ground, but can at most be used only for the logical aim of bringing different 
representations of the same object to a single concept (as different fractions of the 
same value are brought to their lowest expression). (GMS, AA 4:450; my emphasis)
The problem of a circle emerges, then, because the concepts of freedom, auton-
omy, and morality are all co-entailing. Analyzing freedom leads us to the con-
cept of autonomy, and analyzing autonomy leads us to the concept of morality 
(GMS, AA 4:447). Yet, the movement from one to another is not a movement of 
justification: it is a movement of clarification. At no point have we established 
a ‘ground’ (Grund) for anything. All we have shown, rather, is that apparently 
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different representations reduce to a common source. And that is true regardless 
of our starting point. Whether we start from freedom and end up with morality, 
or whether we start from morality and end up with freedom, we cannot con-
ceptualize our way to the validity of a concept.
This begins to explain why Kant voices his worry in the first place. What com-
mentators often overlook is that Kant is trying to motivate the final ‘transition’ 
(Übergang) of the Groundwork, the transition from a ‘metaphysics of morals’ 
(the task of Groundwork II) to a ‘critique of pure practical reason’ or what he also 
calls a ‘critique of the subject’ (the task of Groundwork III) (GMS, AA 4:440).18 In 
Kant’s view, a metaphysics of morals is effective for investigating our commonly 
received notions of duty. When we consider the structure of imperatives and 
their relation to rational beings in general, we can specify the formula of the 
moral law in terms of autonomy. We would never have been able to see this 
connection had we – like the popular philosophers of Kant’s day – adopted a 
mixed method of inquiry. And yet, as we learn by the end of Groundwork II, the 
method of a metaphysics of morals is also limited. Since it does nothing more 
than analyze and clarify concepts, it is unfit to justify our everyday notions of 
duty (GMS, AA 4:445). What we need, Kant thinks, is a new method, what he 
calls a ‘critique.’ Only a critique – that is, an investigation into the bounds of our 
faculty of reason – will decide whether we are justified in thinking we are free.
My suggestion is that Kant is advancing a methodological point at the 
beginning of Groundwork III. When we employ the method of a metaphysics of 
morals, we are entitled to make analytic claims about freedom, autonomy, and 
morality since we are only attempting to explicate their conceptual structure. 
The moment we actually claim to be free, however, we are no longer within the 
sphere of analysis: we are asserting a synthetic claim of real possibility, and such 
a claim now demands justification. Without this justification, our claim to be 
free would lack proper warrant – in short, we would be begging the question. 
Yet, my point is that we would be begging the question either way: so long as 
we only employ the method of a metaphysics of morals, we have no basis to 
assert the reality of freedom or the validity of the categorical imperative. So 
Kant’s worry about a circle is his way of telling us that we need to go beyond 
the sphere of analysis and examine our faculty of reason instead, but it is left 
open at this point whether he thinks the ultimate proof of our freedom will be 
moral or non-moral in character.
3.2. The intelligible world: a moral ideal
After introducing the problem of a circle, Kant tells us there is only ‘one way 
out, namely to inquire whether we do not take a different standpoint when by 
means of freedom we think ourselves as causes efficient a priori than when we 
represent ourselves in terms of our actions as effects that we see before our 
eyes’ (GMS, AA 4:450). This different standpoint leads him to the concept of an 
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intelligible world, which we arrive at by abstracting from every condition of the 
world of sense, including our needs, impulses, and inclinations. What is left over 
from this abstraction is an idea, the idea of a world governed by rational laws. 
But Kant is clear that the force of the idea is entirely practical: it gives us nothing 
to intuit or cognize.19 Thus, in a revealing passage near the end of Groundwork 
III, he writes that the idea of an intelligible world
signifies only a ‘something’ that is left over when I have excluded from the deter-
mining grounds of my will everything belonging to the world of sense, merely in 
order to limit the principle of motives from the field of sensibility by circumscribing 
this field and showing that it does not include everything within itself but that 
there is still more beyond it; but of this something more I have no further cogni-
zance. As for pure reason, which thinks this ideal, after its isolation from all matter, 
that is, cognition of objects, nothing is left for me but the form of it – namely the 
practical law of the universal validity of maxims – and to think of reason, con-
formably with this, with reference to a pure world of understanding as a possible 
efficient cause, that is, a cause determining the will. (GMS, AA 4:462)20
The general direction of Kant’s argument comes out clearly here. He is saying 
we can think of the law of an intelligible world – as the ‘practical law of the 
universal validity of maxims’ – and we can think of our reason in conformity 
with this law – as a ‘cause determining the will.’ In doing so, we recognize our 
capacity to act independently of all motives coming from the world of sense. 
We recognize that our faculty of reason has a pure use beyond the satisfaction 
of our needs, impulses, and inclinations. As the cited passage also makes clear, 
Kant is saying that when we think of ourselves in conformity with the law of an 
intelligible world, we have grounds to ascribe freedom to ourselves. From the 
standpoint of this ideal, we can go beyond mere analysis and claim to be free, 
but – and this is the crucial point – the basis of our claim is of a moral character, 
for it rests on our consciousness of a pure practical law.21
Support for this reading also comes from what Kant says about our com-
mon presupposition of freedom earlier in the text. The ‘legitimate claim even 
of common human reason to freedom of the will,’ he writes, ‘is founded on the 
consciousness and the granted presupposition of the independence of reason 
from merely subjectively determining causes’ (GMS, AA 4:457). In the very next 
paragraph, Kant links this consciousness of independence to the ‘law’ we give 
ourselves in the intelligible world:
So it is that the human being claims for himself a will which lets nothing be put 
to his account that belongs merely to his desires and inclinations, and on the 
contrary thinks as possible by means of it, indeed as necessary, actions that can 
be done only by disregarding all desires and sensible incitements. The causality 
of such actions lies in him as intelligence and in the laws of effects and actions in 
accordance with principles of an intelligible world, of which he knows nothing 
more than that in it reason alone, and indeed pure reason independent of sensi-
bility, gives the law. (GMS, AA 4:457)22
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Our warrant for thinking we are free therefore comes not merely from our mem-
bership in an intelligible world, but from our consciousness of the law we give 
to ourselves in this world – the moral law. No longer limited to the world of 
sense and the practical perspective it affords us, then, we can at last see the 
real possibility of determining our will to action on the basis of pure reason 
alone. And since we are no longer analyzing a relationship between concepts, 
the threat Kant used to motivate his discussion, the threat of a ‘hidden circle,’ 
is now out of place.
Of course, one might still wonder: Even if we are entitled to think of our-
selves as free for the reasons just spelled out, what right do we have to speak 
of those moral laws governing the intelligible world? Do they not stand in need 
of justification as well? Kant’s answer is clear, but it only becomes explicit at the 
end of Groundwork III. Given the nature of human reason, he explains, we can 
only comprehend what happens or what ought to happen on the basis of prior 
conditions (GMS, AA 4:463). Yet the laws of morality convey absolute necessity. 
So when it comes to those laws themselves, the most Kant says we can do is 
appreciate the fact that our philosophical investigation has come to an end. That 
means we cannot secure a deduction of morality proper, but we can at least 
see why this is no fault of our own. ‘It is,’ he writes, ‘no criticism of our deduction 
of the supreme principle of morality, but an accusation that would have to be 
brought against human reason in general, that it cannot make comprehensible, 
as regards its absolute necessity, an unconditional practical law (such as the 
categorical imperative must be)’ (GMS, AA 4:463).23
Bringing these pieces together, we can now reconstruct Kant’s argument 
into the following steps:
Step 1  When we think of ourselves as ‘causes efficient a priori,’ we presup-
pose our membership in a world beyond the influences of our sensible 
nature.
Step 2  This ‘merely intelligible’ world gives us nothing to intuit or cognize. 
But it gives us an ideal for thinking of our will in conformity with pure 
practical laws.
Step 3  When we think of our will in this way, we have a standpoint for cog-
nizing our freedom: our capacity to act by reason alone. This capacity 
is equivalent to autonomy.
Having reached this point in his discussion, Kant is able to connect his deduc-
tion back to the formula of morality he had established earlier in Groundwork II:
Step 4  Autonomy is equivalent to the formula of morality: ‘so act as if your 
maxims were to serve at the same time as a universal law (for all rational 
beings).’
With this outline in hand, we are ready to turn to the second Critique. But first, let 
us recall that Kant had also promised us a second argument, writing that he would 
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offer a ‘deduction of the concept of freedom from pure practical reason, and 
with it the possibility of a categorical imperative’ (GMS, AA 4:447; my emphasis). 
After avoiding the threat of a circle, Kant goes on to say that the moral law takes 
the form of an imperative for us because it has its source within us: what we 
‘would’ do were we only members of an intelligible world is what we ‘ought’ to do 
as beings who belong to the world of sense ‘at the same time’ (GMS, AA 4:454).24 
While unpacking this argument would take us beyond the scope of this paper, I 
mention it here only to make the following point salient: in Groundwork III, Kant 
never equates a deduction of the categorical imperative with a deduction of 
the moral law itself. As he makes clear, the latter is beyond the comprehension 
of human reason and so beyond the reach of any philosophical proof.25
4. The argument of the second Critique
4.1. A ‘vainly sought deduction’
Those sympathetic to the Reversal Reading may now wonder how I can explain 
Kant’s apparent confession in the second Critique that his earlier strategy of 
justification was a failure. In a much-discussed passage, Kant writes that ‘the 
moral law cannot be proved by any deduction,’ adding:
But something different and quite paradoxical takes the place of this vainly sought 
deduction of the moral principle, namely that the moral principle conversely itself 
serves as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experi-
ence could prove but which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible 
[ … ] namely the faculty of freedom, of which the moral law, which itself has no 
need of justifying grounds, proves not only the possibility but the reality in beings 
who cognize this law as binding upon them. (KpV, AA 5:47)
As far as confessions go, this passage seems to present us with strong evidence 
that Kant changed his mind by the time he composed the second Critique. For 
what could this ‘vainly sought deduction of the moral principle’ refer to, if not 
the very deduction Kant had ventured in 1785?26
This passage acquires a different meaning, I believe, when we read it along-
side the ‘concluding remark’ of Groundwork III just mentioned. In this final para-
graph, Kant explains why our faculty of reason faces a dilemma (GMS, AA 4:463). 
On the one hand, our reason is driven to seek the condition of what happens or 
what ought to happen with the aim of finding something absolutely necessary, 
something that would end the regress of conditions. On the other hand, due to 
the very limitations of reason itself, we can only comprehend what happens or 
what ought to happen when we discover its underlying condition. So the very 
principle driving the activity of reason itself, namely, to find something uncon-
ditionally necessary, can never be satisfied. As Kant puts it, reason ‘restlessly 
seeks the unconditionally necessary and sees itself constrained to assume it 
without any means of making it comprehensible to itself, fortunate enough if 
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it can discover only the concept that is compatible with this presupposition,’ 
that is, the concept of freedom (GMS, AA 4:463).
This is why Kant thinks we should not hope to explain the moral law’s neces-
sity, such as a deduction would require of us, because its necessity is by defini-
tion unconditional. In other words, a deduction of the moral law would be vainly 
sought since we cannot ‘comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of 
the moral imperative’ (GMS, AA 4:463). When Kant makes this point explicit in 
the second Critique, he may have Groundwork III in mind, but not because he is 
repudiating his earlier approach. On my reading, Kant may be wanting to draw 
the same lesson in each text, that human insight reaches an end as soon as 
we are dealing with fundamental laws or fundamental faculties (KpV, AA 5:47). 
That is why he thinks seeking to comprehend the moral law would be futile. All 
we can do is comprehend its ‘incomprehensibility’ (Unbegreiflichkeit), and that 
is, Kant says, ‘all that can be justly required of a philosophy that strives in its 
principles to the boundary of human reason’ (GMS, AA 4:463). On this point at 
least Groundwork III and the second Critique stand in agreement: a deduction 
of the moral law is beyond our explanatory reach.27
Granted, when Kant says that the moral law ‘cannot be proved by any deduc-
tion,’ it is hard to rid ourselves of the impression that he is referring to his earlier 
strategy of argument. Yet further study reveals that this impression is deceiving 
since the argument of Groundwork III refers to a deduction of the categorical 
imperative, not to a deduction of the moral law (GMS, AA 4:454). The insight Kant 
is seeking in the final section of the Groundwork is insight into how the moral 
law takes the form of an imperative (or ‘ought’) for finite rational beings like 
us. Strictly speaking, then, he is seeking a deduction of the law’s ‘necessitation’ 
(Nötigung), not a deduction of its ‘necessity’ (Notwendigkeit). As we have seen, 
Kant denies that we could ever attain the latter, given the subjective limitations 
of our reason (the fact that we only comprehend things on the basis of prior 
conditions). As a result, Kant’s remark about a ‘vainly sought deduction’ does not 
support the Reversal Reading since the deduction he affirms in Groundwork III 
and the deduction he denies in the second Critique are not one and the same.
Interestingly, the only place where Kant makes a direct reference to the 
Groundwork is in the Preface to the second Critique, but what he says there is 
seemingly positive:
I must leave it to connoisseurs of a work of this kind to estimate whether such a 
system of pure practical reason as is here developed from the critique of it has 
cost much or little trouble, especially so as not to miss the right point of view 
from which the whole can be correctly traced out. It presupposes, indeed, the 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, but only insofar as this constitutes pre-
liminary acquaintance with the principle of duty and provides and justifies [rech-
tfertigt] a determinate formula of it; otherwise, it stands on its own. (KpV, AA 5:8)
For decades after the publication of the second Critique, readers would refer to 
this passage to explain the relationship between Kant’s two works, as we saw 
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with Mellin’s Encyclopedic Dictionary. Looking at this passage now, there is no 
trace of a rupture in Kant’s conception of the path he took from 1785 to 1788. 
Instead of confessing a change of mind, he underlines the continuity of his pro-
ject, not only with his formulation of the moral principle (the task of Groundwork 
I and II), but also with his justification of it (the task of Groundwork III). What is 
more, the language of KpV, AA 5:8 is strongly reminiscent of what Kant says in 
the Preface to the Groundwork: that the text is ‘nothing more than the search 
for and establishment of’ the principle of morality (GMS, AA 4:392). When Kant 
later says that the second Critique ‘presupposes’ the Groundwork, he may not be 
restricting his statement to the task of clarification, for in each place, he speaks 
of justification (‘Rechtfertigung’ or ‘Festsetzung’).28 In any case, there is no direct 
evidence here to support the Reversal Reading.29
4.2. The continuity reading
All the pieces for my alternative account are now in place. To begin with, it is 
clear that Kant still accepts the first step of his 1785 deduction:
Step 1  When we think of ourselves as ‘causes efficient a priori,’ we presup-
pose our membership in a world beyond the influences of our sensible 
nature.
One difference is that in the second Critique, Kant does not move directly to:
Step 2  This ‘merely intelligible’ world gives us nothing to intuit or cognize. 
But it gives us an ideal for thinking of our will in conformity with pure 
practical laws.
Instead, Kant appeals to the Fact of Reason: ‘It is therefore the moral law,’ he 
writes, ‘that first offers itself to us and, inasmuch as reason presents it as a deter-
mining ground not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed 
quite independent of them, leads directly to the concept of freedom’ (KpV, AA 
5:29–30; cf., 5:4n). Nevertheless, it is clear that Step 2 of Groundwork III plays 
a similar role as the Fact of Reason, for in both cases, Kant is appealing to our 
consciousness of pure practical laws to establish our freedom. So both the argu-
ments of Groundwork III and the second Critique use a moral premise to infer:
Step 3  When we think of our will in this way, we have a standpoint for cog-
nizing our freedom: our capacity to act by reason alone. This capacity 
is equivalent to autonomy.
Nor do the parallels between Kant’s two works end at this point. Later, in the 
second Critique, he explains that the law of autonomy ‘is the moral law, which 
is therefore the fundamental law of a supersensible nature and of a pure world 
of the understanding’ (KpV, AA 5:42). Here, it is worth recalling that Kant made 
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a similar move in Groundwork III when he connected the deduction of freedom 
back to his formula of the moral principle,30 leading us to:
Step 4  Autonomy is equivalent to the formula of morality: ‘so act as if your 
maxims were to serve at the same time as a universal law (for all rational 
beings).’
Finally, while the question of how a moral ‘ought’ is possible is not central to the 
second Critique, Kant does make a point of addressing it. In the case of human 
beings, he explains, ‘the law has the form of an imperative, because in them, as 
rational beings, one can presuppose a pure will but, insofar as they are beings 
affected by needs and sensible motives, not a holy will, that is, such a will as 
would not be capable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law’ (KpV, AA 
5:32).31 Just as we saw in Groundwork III, Kant is saying that moral imperatives 
are possible for us because they have their source within us: what we ‘would’ 
do were we only members of an intelligible world is what we ‘ought’ to do as 
beings who belong to the world of sense ‘at the same time’ (GMS, AA 4:454). On 
the whole, then, there is remarkable consistency in the layout of each argument. 
Kant is not venturing a deduction of the moral law itself, but in both places, he 
is offering a deduction of freedom, followed by an account of how the moral 
law takes the form of an imperative.32
5. Objections and replies
Stepping back, there are at least three objections one could raise against the 
preceding sections of this paper. One could argue that I have overlooked Kant’s 
solution to the circle problem in Groundwork III (Section 5.1), and one could 
argue that I have overlooked evidence that Kant was seeking a non-moral route 
to freedom, both in the Groundwork (Section 5.2) and in his earlier writings 
(Section 5.3).
5.1. First objection: the circle problem (again)
Kant in fact gives us two characterizations of the circle problem in Groundwork 
III, and commentators often draw upon the second to support the view that he 
was seeking a non-moral argument. On this occasion, Kant writes:
The suspicion that we raised above is now removed, the suspicion that a hidden 
circle was contained in our inference from freedom to autonomy and from the 
latter to the moral law – namely that we perhaps took as a ground the idea of 
freedom only for the sake of the moral law, so that we could afterwards infer 
the latter in turn from freedom, and that we were thus unable to furnish any 
ground at all for the moral law but could put it forward only as a petitio principii 
[or ‘question-begging’ claim] disposed souls would gladly grant us, but never as 
a demonstrable proposition. (GMS, AA 4:453)
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Here, one might worry that if my reading is correct, and Kant was appealing to a 
moral premise to establish our freedom of will, then he should be saying some-
thing else in this passage – that the suspicion of a circle has been confirmed. On 
my reading, it may seem that Kant was starting with the moral law (something 
‘disposed souls would gladly grant us’) in a way that would be question-beg-
ging if directed to a skeptic (a ‘petitio principii [ … ] but never a demonstrable 
proposition’). When we return to the cited passage, however, Kant is clear in 
saying that he has established the moral law as a demonstrable proposition, 
and this suggests he was arguing to, rather than from, a moral claim, just as the 
standard reading tells us.33
As compelling as this evidence appears, let us first consider the meaning 
behind Kant’s terminology more closely. To be sure, talk of a ‘demonstrable prop-
osition’ seems to be precisely what Kant denies in the second Critique: that we 
can grasp the moral law’s necessity as a principle for all rational beings. And if 
this is what he has in mind in Groundwork III, there would be good reason to 
think his project of justification changes significantly in later works. Yet on reflec-
tion, it turns out that Kant’s reference at GMS, AA 4:453 is open to interpretation. 
For example, the proposition he says requires demonstration could refer to his 
formula of the moral law, rather than to the law’s supreme normative authority 
(which Kant later says we cannot comprehend).34 This would be consistent with 
my reading because the ‘moral premise’ I have claimed Kant employs to establish 
our freedom of will (the pure rational law we cognize from the standpoint of 
an intelligible world in Step 2) is distinct from the ‘moral conclusion’ he works 
toward (the formula of this law in terms of a principle of autonomy in Step 4). 
In view of this distinction, there is no conflict between the account I favor and 
Kant’s second characterization of the circle problem. There are other ways to 
understand his talk of a ‘demonstrable proposition,’ and for the purposes of this 
paper, that all I need to make the Continuity Reading a plausible alternative.
5.2. Second objection: a non-moral route in the Groundwork
A second objection one could raise is that my account of Groundwork III over-
looks two passages where Kant appears to be offering non-moral evidence for 
our freedom of will. The first concerns his remark that rational beings must act 
under the idea of freedom (Section 5.2.1); the second concerns his remark that 
theoretical reason is self-active within us (Section 5.2.2).
5.2.1. First passage: the idea of freedom
Starting with the first passage, Kant writes:
I say now: every being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom 
is just because of that really free in a practical respect, that is, all laws that are 
inseparably bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his will had been validly 
pronounced free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy. (GMS, AA 4:448)35
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Given its placement in the text, it may look like Kant is advancing the following 
argument: (i) that freedom and morality are co-entailing concepts, (ii) that we 
must think of ourselves under the idea of freedom, and (iii) that morality is 
therefore valid for us. The problem with this interpretation is that Kant does not 
intend his remark about acting ‘under the idea of freedom’ as a premise in his 
deduction. The remark occurs in subsection two where Kant is offering nothing 
more than ‘preparatory elucidation’ (GMS, AA 4:447). Afterwards, he explains that 
all he has done in subsection two is trace the ‘determinate concept of moral-
ity back to the idea of freedom,’ indicating that his discussion belongs to the 
analytic side of Groundwork III, that is, before the transition to a critique. Kant 
also remarks that ‘we could not, however, prove freedom as something actual 
even in ourselves or in human nature; we saw only that we must presuppose 
it if we want to think of a being as rational and endowed with consciousness 
of its causality with regard to its actions, i.e. with a will’ (GMS, AA 4:447). Kant’s 
claim is only that we must attribute freedom to the concept of a rational being 
with a will, and the question of whether we must attribute freedom to ourselves 
remains open.
Still, one might think we can reconstruct an argument for freedom on the 
basis of subsection two, regardless of how well it captures Kant’s intentions in 
Groundwork III. Indeed, a number of contemporary philosophers have thought 
there is a deeper truth to Kant’s assertion that a rational being must act ‘under 
the idea of freedom’ since this treats freedom as a ‘necessary condition of play-
ing the game of deliberation’ (Hill 1998, 265) or as a ‘fundamental feature of the 
standpoint from which decisions are made’ (Korsgaard 1996b, 163). Along these 
lines, it seems Kant could have said:
(1)   We must play the game of deliberation.
(2)   In playing this game, we must think of ourselves under the idea of 
freedom.
(3)   A free will and a will under moral laws are co-entailing concepts.
(4)   Therefore, given (1)–(3), morality is valid for us.
Even as a reconstruction, it is not clear if this argument works since the sense of 
‘freedom’ in premise (2) is too weak to support the inference to premise (3). To 
see why, suppose that I am caught between two desires, say, between working 
for the rest of the afternoon and going to the movies. We can agree that there 
is a sense of ‘freedom’ relevant to my decision-making: when I give reasons for 
my action, whether to work or go to the movies, I am guiding myself by con-
cepts, and by doing so, I am presupposing my distance from the two desires I 
feel at the time. Accepting this, we are still not committed to saying that I must 
regard myself as independent from all external influences when I play the game 
of deliberation, for I could very well be calculating the comparative degree of 
pleasure I will receive from one activity verses the other. Nor are we committed 
to saying that I must regard myself as autonomous in this game, i.e. as legislating 
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myself by laws of reason, for the principles I appeal to in making up my mind 
may be prudential and so dependent on my natural sensibility after all. In short, 
the status of ‘freedom’ as a practical assumption – even if a true characterization 
of agency in general – falls short of both the negative and positive senses of 
freedom in premise (3), and so falls short of supporting the conclusion in (4).
5.2.2. Second passage: the spontaneity of theoretical reason
Aside from whether the above reconstruction works, those interested in captur-
ing Kant’s intentions in Groundwork III will no doubt press me on another pas-
sage where he appears to offer non-moral evidence for our freedom.36 Consider 
what he says, for example, about the spontaneity of theoretical reason:
Now, a human being actually does find in himself a capacity by which he is dis-
tinguished from all other things, even from himself, in so far as he is affected by 
objects, and that is reason … [This faculty] under the name of the ideas shows a 
spontaneity so pure that thereby he goes far beyond anything that sensibility can 
ever afford him. (GMS, AA 4:452; cf., KrV A546/B574; Prol AA, 4:345)
A few sentences earlier, Kant had claimed that ‘what reaches our consciousness 
not by affection of the senses, but immediately’ exhibits a ‘pure activity’ (reine 
Thätigkeit) within us, and that such activity indicates that we do not belong 
wholly to the world of sense. After identifying the source of this activity in our 
capacity to think ideas of reason, Kant then concludes: ‘On account of this a 
rational being must view itself, as an intelligence (thus not from the side of its 
lower powers), as belonging not to the world of sense, but to that of under-
standing’ (GMS, AA 4:452). Here, the argument seems to be something like this:
(1)   We are conscious of reason’s pure self-activity within ourselves.
(2)   This activity secures our membership in the intelligible world.
(3)   As members of this world, we are negatively free (i.e. free from all 
external influences).
(4)   The principle of a negatively free will is the principle of self-legislation.
(5)   The principle of self-legislation is equivalent to morality.
(6)   Therefore, given (1)–(5), morality is valid for us.
Now it is unclear to me if this conclusion goes through since the spontaneity 
we display in thinking ideas is not yet a causality, that is, it is not yet freedom 
to act on pure practical reasons.37 However, for our purposes here, I need not 
deny that Kant appeals to the spontaneity of theoretical reason in Groundwork 
III, and so I need not deny the textual evidence supporting premises (1)–(3). 
The question we must ask is whether these premises are meant to warrant our 
claim to freedom, as many commentators think, or whether they are merely 
intended to prepare the way for such a warrant. My own view is that the second 
option is more charitable and also more consistent with the range of texts we 
have examined above,38 and while I lack space to explore this issue at length, it 
is certainly one that deserves further discussion.
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5.3. Third objection: a non-moral route pre-1785
A final objection I would like to consider is that my reading lies in tension with 
the trajectory of Kant’s pre-1785 writings, all of which suggest he was seeking 
a non-moral route to freedom. In the larger context of these writings, it seems 
that Kant hoped to derive freedom from theoretical reason, either by appealing 
to the spontaneity of ‘I think’ (Section 5.3.1) or by appealing to the spontaneity 
of the understanding (Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1. First passage: the spontaneity of ‘I think’
The first piece of evidence is from Kant’s lectures on metaphysics during the 
mid-1770s:
When I say, ‘I think, I act, etc.’ either the word ‘I’ is employed improperly, or I am 
free [ … ] But now I am conscious to myself that I can say: ‘I do’; therefore I am 
conscious of no determination in me, and thus I act absolutely freely [ … ] All 
practical objective propositions would have no sense if human beings were not 
free. (V-Met/Heinze, AA 28:269)
The present argument seems to be (i) that by expressing ‘I think, I do’ we display 
a pure form of spontaneity, (ii) that this spontaneity proves our freedom from 
all external influences, and (iii) that we therefore have a secure foundation for 
‘practical objective propositions,’ i.e. for moral laws. As Dieter Henrich interprets 
this passage in his 1960 essay, Kant is proceeding from a strictly theoretical start-
ing point. ‘That moral obligation is something real,’ Henrich explains, ‘is certain 
because the consciousness of the self in thought, which alone could doubt that 
obligation, can be conceived only as freedom. The principle of theoretical reason 
gives foundation to the possibility of moral existence.’39
Other passages from this lecture show that Henrich’s reading is less decisive 
than it first appears. At one point, Kant says freedom is beyond our comprehen-
sion, but that we still have grounds to attribute freedom to ourselves because 
we are subject to practical imperatives (V-Met/Heinze, AA 28:270). After claiming 
that ‘all practical objective propositions would have no sense if human beings 
were not free,’ he adds: ‘But now there are such imperatives according to which 
I should do something; therefore all practical imperatives, problematic as well 
as pragmatic and moral, must presuppose a freedom in me’ (V-Met/Heinze, AA 
28:269). This point is all the more important when we return to the passage 
Henrich cites, for we can see that Kant is using a normative premise – the con-
sciousness of our will under imperatives – to warrant our claim to ‘absolute 
spontaneity’ (V-Met/Heinze, AA 28:268). What makes Kant’s argument in the 
1770s different from his mature position, then, is not that he appeals to the 
spontaneity of thinking to infer our freedom in the practical sphere, as Henrich 
and others suppose. What makes his argument different is that he thinks we 
have access to our freedom via practical imperatives in general, not via moral 
imperatives in particular.
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5.3.2. Second passage: from thinking to willing
Another place scholars have thought Kant was seeking a non-moral route to 
freedom is in his ‘Review of Schulz’ from 1783 – roughly the time he was plan-
ning to write the Groundwork. Near the end of this review, Kant says that even 
a strict fatalist
has assumed in the depths of his soul that understanding is able to determine his 
judgment in accordance with objective grounds that are always valid and is not 
subject to the mechanism of merely subjectively determining causes [ … ] hence 
he always admits freedom to think, without which there is no reason. In the same 
way [Eben so] he must also assume freedom of the will in acting, without which 
there would be no morals. (RezSchulz, AA 8:14)
Scholars have read this passage as saying that the spontaneity we exhibit in the 
cognitive sphere (where we govern our understanding) warrants the assump-
tion that we are free in the practical sphere (where we govern our will). However, 
a few sentences above the cited passage, Kant writes that the ‘most confirmed 
fatalist, who is a fatalist as long as he gives himself up to mere speculation, must 
still, as soon as he has to do with wisdom and duty, always act as if he were free, 
and this idea also actually produces the deed that accords with it and can alone 
produce it’ (RezSchulz, AA 8:13; my emphasis). Thus, Kant’s point is that a fatalist 
must assume he is free as soon as he becomes conscious of the demands of 
morality (i.e. ‘wisdom and duty’), for such demands presuppose his independ-
ence from sensible inclinations. Compared to his lectures on metaphysics, it 
is clear that by 1783, Kant had attained a version of his mature position – that 
only moral laws provide grounds for cognizing our freedom – since he must 
have realized that technical and prudential imperatives do not presuppose our 
absolute spontaneity.
If anything, the passages I have discussed above show that Kant’s commit-
ment to finding moral evidence for freedom is much earlier than commentators 
have assumed. In addition to the ‘Review of Schulz’ from 1783,40 we find Kant 
arguing along these lines in the 1781 edition of the first Critique:
I assume that there are really pure moral laws, which determine completely a priori 
(without regard to empirical motives, i.e. happiness) the action and omission, i.e. 
the use of the freedom of a rational being in general, and that these laws command 
absolutely (not merely hypothetically under the presupposition of other empirical 
ends), and are thus necessary in every respect. I can legitimately presuppose this 
proposition by appealing not only to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists but 
also to the moral judgment of every human being, if he will distinctly think such a law. 
(KrV A807/B835; my emphasis)41
By 1781, then, we have evidence that Kant believed moral laws offer us grounds 
for cognizing our freedom, and what is more, we have evidence that he consid-
ered the ‘judgment of every human being’ sufficient to assume the existence of 
such laws.42 Of course, it is difficult to say precisely when Kant adopted this view 
since the lectures on metaphysics from the mid-1770s suggest he had yet to see 
the special status of moral imperatives compared to technical and prudential 
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imperatives. From the documents we have of this time, signs foreshadowing 
Kant’s mature view begin to appear in the late 1770s, and on inspection, it is 
striking how close they come to stating a thesis normally associated with the 
doctrine of the Fact of Reason. In Reflexion 6849, for example, Kant writes that 
the ‘primary ought (original = absolute or the universal idea of duty) cannot 
be comprehended,’ adding in Reflexion 6850: ‘The primary ought is a condition 
under which alone freedom becomes a capacity in accordance with constant 
rules that determine a priori.’ But even if we treat such literary fragments as 
inconclusive, the fact remains that Kant’s moral orientation shines through in 
the early 1780s. And we should not overlook the fact that in the Groundwork 
itself, Kant states clearly that reason ‘first becomes aware that it can of itself also 
be practical’ through ‘the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, 
mixed with no foreign addition of empirical inducements’ (GMS, AA 4:410; my 
emphasis). So whether we focus on the official or unofficial documents of this 
time, there is ample evidence to believe Kant was committed to a moral argu-
ment for freedom much earlier than 1788.
6. The real difference between Kant’s two works
If the interpretation I have defended above is correct, then we have no reason 
to believe Kant changed his approach to moral justification between 1785 and 
1788. Instead, we have good grounds to take Kant at his word, as readers did 
for many decades, when he claimed that the second Critique ‘presupposes’ the 
Groundwork in its formulation and justification of the moral principle. As we have 
seen, the real difference between Kant’s two works is a matter of presentation: 
the second Critique says little about the formula of the moral law, and even 
less about how it appears to us as an ‘ought.’ In my view, we can explain this 
difference in terms of the two genres Kant self-consciously worked in: classical 
moral philosophy, on the one hand, and critical transcendental philosophy, on 
the other hand.
In the Preface to the second Critique, Kant tells us his goal is to show ‘that 
there is pure practical reason’ (KpV, AA 5:3). This differs from his stated goal in the 
Groundwork, namely, to explain and establish ‘the supreme principle of moral-
ity’ (GMS, AA 4:392). Now if the second Critique presupposes the Groundwork, 
we should not be surprised to discover abbreviated versions of the 1785 work 
turning up in the 1788 work. Bearing in mind Kant’s different aims, we can see 
why he would devote an entire section to explaining the principle of morality 
as a law of autonomy in Groundwork II, only to compress this discussion in the 
second Critique. In the latter work, Kant bypasses his complex analysis of the 
formulas, and proceeds directly to what he calls ‘the fundamental law’ of pure 
practical reason: ‘So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the 
same time as a principle in a giving of universal law’ (KpV, AA 5:30). Similarly, 
we can also see why Kant would devote an entire subsection to establishing 
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the principle of morality as a categorical imperative in Groundwork III, only to 
compress this discussion in the second Critique. In the latter work, Kant bypasses 
the details of his second deduction, and proceeds directly to say that morality 
takes the form of an imperative for us because we are, unlike holy wills, imper-
fectly rational (KpV, AA 5:32).
My hypothesis, then, is that the Groundwork and the second Critique diverge 
in their presentations because they belong to different genres of exposition. On 
the one hand, the Groundwork was written to prepare for a ‘future metaphysics 
of morals,’ a project Kant had conceived for many years but only got around to 
publishing in 1797. What this shows is that Kant’s Groundwork belongs to the 
tradition of classical moral philosophy: it aims to support a system of normative 
principles that could inform real-life decision-making.43 What Kant must have 
realized was necessary before the publication of such a system was a clearing 
of foundations – in particular, a clearing away of popular moral philosophy – in 
order to articulate the true method of moral inquiry (cf., KrV Axx). On the other 
hand, the second Critique was written to complete a project Kant had already 
begun in 1781 with his first Critique. What this shows, by way of comparison, is 
that the second Critique belongs to the genre of Kant’s own critical philosophy: 
it aims to show that pure reason, though wholly dialectical in the speculative 
sphere, has a legitimate use in the practical sphere. From the perspective of 
genres, Kant’s brevity in the second Critique makes perfect sense. He did not feel 
compelled to offer a long analysis of the categorical imperative, nor a deduction 
of its possibility, because his aim was no longer to prepare for a future meta-
physics of morals. His aim was to render the transition from pure speculative 
to pure practical reason more perspicuous, and to that end, his first objective 
was simply to show that pure practical reason exists.44
7. Closing remarks
What I hope to have achieved in this paper is a plausible alternative to the 
standard story of Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom. After showing that 
it is relatively new in the reception of Kant’s ethics (Section 2), I suggested that 
contemporary readers have found this story compelling because it purports to 
explain Kant’s worry about a ‘hidden circle’ in Groundwork III (Section 3.1). On my 
reading, the idea of an ‘intelligible world’ avoids the circle, but only because our 
consciousness of its laws, i.e. the laws of morality, legitimates our claim to free-
dom (Section 3.2). Turning to the second Critique, I showed that Kant’s references 
to the Groundwork are positive on every score, and that his comment about a 
‘vainly sought deduction’ of the moral law is consistent with the conclusion of 
Groundwork III (Section 4.1). With these details in place, I offered my full defense 
of the Continuity Reading, showing that the arguments of Groundwork III and 
the second Critique share the same general structure (Section 4.2). Then, after 
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defending my reading from three potential objections (Section 5), I offered a 
hypothesis for why Kant’s two works still differ in their presentation (Section 6).
Questions of interpretation aside, it is difficult to say how we should eval-
uate Kant’s project of justification today, if not in terms of his failure to derive 
the moral law from non-moral premises. This impression is only reinforced 
by the fact that a number of contemporary Kantians have thought we can 
reconstruct a successful defense of the moral law from an account of action 
and agency in general.45 In this light, Kant’s admission in the second Critique 
that no deduction of the moral law is possible, even if consistent with his 
earlier work, appears to fall short of what we ultimately want: a strict phil-
osophical proof. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
Kant drew attention to the limits of his argument in Groundwork III, saying 
that it is ‘a reproach that must be brought against human reason in general, 
that it cannot make comprehensible as regards its absolute necessity an 
unconditional practical law (such as the categorical imperative must be)’ 
(GMS, AA 4:463). Whether or not the reproach is just, I do not think we should 
assume in advance that our ideal strategy is one of finding a non-moral route 
to freedom. Kant believed our consciousness of the moral law is the only 
viable orientation a project of justification can take because it is the only 
orientation that works within the bounds of human reason.
At this final juncture, it may seem that we are left with a standoff of 
intuitions about what the task of justification in ethics should accomplish. 
Those who think it should refute all forms of moral skepticism will likely 
find my version of the Continuity Reading disappointing. If I am right, Kant 
was not seeking to justify the necessity of the moral law; indeed, that is pre-
cisely what he thought goes beyond our comprehension and so beyond the 
scope of any deduction. Those who insist that we should be seeking such a 
deduction will wonder what kind of ‘justification’ of morality Kant ends up 
with in the end, if any. To call our awareness of the moral law a ‘fact’ hardly 
seems satisfying, even if we follow Kant’s repeated claim that this fact is part 
of our common moral consciousness. However, it is worth emphasizing that 
Kant did not regard refuting the skeptic to be the measure of success for 
his moral philosophy. He was very much speaking to those of us who are 
committed to morality, but who lack the self-understanding necessary to 
make this commitment intelligible. That in itself does not settle the standoff 
of intuitions we have, but it does bring an important point to light. It shows 
that how we frame the task of justification in ethics comes down to where we 
locate the center of our discussion – whether in philosophical speculation 
or in ordinary life. In arguing from morality, Kant was, I believe, attempting 
to begin with the latter.
136  O. WARE
Abbreviations
In the case of the Critique of Pure Reason, I follow the standard practice of refer-
ring to the 1781 (A) and 1787 (B) editions. For all other texts, citations appear in 
the order of abbreviation, volume number, and page number from the Akademie 
Ausgabe (AA), Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Königlich Preussische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (29 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900–). Translation 
decisions are my own, though I have consulted (and sometimes followed) The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen 
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–).
Br  Correspondence
FM   What Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany? (1791)
GMS  Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
KpV  Critique of Practical Reason (1788)
KrV   Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787)
KU   Critique of Judgment (1790)
MS   Metaphysics of Morals (1797)
Prol   Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1784)
RGV  Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793)
Refl   Fragments and Reflections
RezSchulz   ‘Review of Schulz’ (1783)
VAMS   ‘Preparatory Work for the Metaphysics of Morals’
V-Met/Heinze  Lectures on Metaphysics: Heinze
V-MS/Vigil   Lectures on Ethics: Vigilantius
VT   ‘On a Newly Raised Superior Tone in Philosophy’ (1796)
Notes
1.  For the standard view, see Ross (1954); Beck (1960); Henrich (1960); Williams 
(1968); Ameriks (1981); Korsgaard (1989); O’Neill (1989); Allison (1990); Łuków 
(1993); Neiman (1994); Hill (1998); Allison (2011); Rawls (2000); Engstrom (2002); 
Darwall (2006); Sussman (2008); Reath (2012); and Grenberg (2013). Other 
scholars find a significant change in Kant’s strategy of justification, not because he 
gave up a proof of the moral law, but because he gave up a non-moral argument 
for freedom. For this view, see Schönecker (1999; 2006; 2013; 2014); Guyer (2009); 
Ludwig (2010); Timmermann (2010); Ludwig (2010; 2012; 2015); Hahmann (2012); 
Bojanowski (forthcoming).
2.  My claim that Kant’s project of justification in ethics is continuous between 
Groundwork III and the second Critique is not new. Some have defended a 
strong version of this reading, according to which Kant’s two works are identical 
(McCarthy 1982); others have defended a more moderate version, according to 
which Kant foreshadows, without developing, the doctrine of the ‘Fact of Reason’ 
in 1785 (Paton 1947; Henrich 1975). What makes my position in this paper novel 
is that, while I am willing to concede that Kant’s two works still differ (contrary 
to the strong version), I shall argue that a moral argument for freedom is already 
present in Groundwork III (contrary to the moderate version).
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3.  That Kant remained committed to this argument after 1787 is clear from various 
published and unpublished texts. For a few examples, see Refl 7316, 7321; KU, AA 
5:275; RGV, AA 6:26n, 6:49n; FM, AA 20:345; VT, AA 8:403; V-MS/Vigil, AA 27:506; 
VAMS, AA 23: 245; and MS, AA 6:252.
4.  To be clear, the argument from freedom to morality says that we have grounds 
independent of the moral law to think we are free, and those grounds explain 
the possibility of the moral law as the supreme principle of our will. By contrast, 
the argument from morality to freedom says that we have no insight into the 
possibility of the moral law as the supreme principle of our will, but that our 
consciousness of this law nevertheless grounds our claim to freedom. One 
obvious criticism facing the latter argument, and often leveled against Kant’s 
doctrine of the Fact of Reason, is that it slips into dogmatism about the moral 
law’s normative authority. Due to limits of space, however, I will not be addressing 
this issue here. I discuss it at greater length in Ware (2014).
5.  Other advocates of this view include Wolff (2009), who defends continuity 
between Kant’s works by comparing Kant’s strategy of moral justification to his 
theory of geometrical postulates (2009), and Puls (2011; 2014), who defends 
continuity by highlighting the role of common human reason in Groundwork III. 
While I am in broad agreement with their accounts, I shall be seeking a new line 
of interpretation in this paper.
6.  In his Letters on Kantian Philosophy from 1786/87, the term ‘Tatsache’ occurs 
numerous times (100, 109, 125, 126). For an excellent study of Reinhold’s role in 
the development of post-Kantian philosophy, see Ameriks (2000).
7.  See his (1796–97, vol. I, 139). For another example, see Brastberger’s (1792, 57, 71).
8.  See his (1796–97, vol. I, 207, 247n, 255, 282, and 352).
9.  See Tittel (1786); Pistorius (1786a; 1786b); and Stattler (1788).
10.  See his (1800, 174–175).
11.  This quotation comes from his (1844, 535).
12.  This essay was translated in 1994 under the title ‘The Concept of Moral Insight 
and Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason.’
13.  Herbert Paton reached a similar conclusion in his book, The Categorical Imperative: 
A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, published in 1947. Curiously, Paton expressed 
a great degree of ambivalence on the topic of whether Kant changed his 
proof-structure in the second Critique. He believed Kant was seeking a strict 
proof in Groundwork III that would derive the validity of the moral law from 
an ‘independent and necessary presupposition of freedom,’ a deduction he 
subsequently gave up in 1788. But in the very next paragraph Paton said, we 
need not ‘exaggerate the difference between the two views’ (1947, 203), adding: 
‘it is doubtful how far he regards freedom in the Groundwork as a non-moral 
principle’ (204). What is even more odd is that Paton cited the final paragraph 
of Groundwork III where Kant states the impossibility of deducing the moral law 
from theoretical premises (GMS, AA 4:463). Yet, Paton took this as evidence that 
Kant was merely ‘beginning to see dimly’ that his proof was doomed to fail (225).
14.  See his (1994, 81). Henrich appears to have changed his mind in a later essay 
when he claimed that Kant’s argument in Groundwork III has an irreducibly moral 
core (1975, 86). See also Ameriks’s recent comments (2012, 24–25) on his earlier 
(1981) defense of the Reversal Reading.
15.  Barbara Herman’s observation that in the ‘resurgence of work on Kant’s ethics, 
one notices the quiet avoidance of the issue of justification’ sadly rings true 
today (1989, 131), especially in the English scholarship. Only recently has the 
German scholarship shown a resurgence of work on Groundwork III and the 
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second Critique. See, for example, the two collections edited by Puls (2014) and 
Schönecker (2015).
16.  The status of the circle in Groundwork III is worthy of its own treatment, and here 
I can only touch the surface of a much larger issue. For further discussion, see 
Schönecker (1999); Allison (2011); and Berger (2015).
17.  With the exception of Wolff (2009, 546, note 64) and Puls (2011, 543, note 19), 
the significance of this remark has been neglected in the literature devoted to 
Groundwork III.
18.  I offer a more detailed account of the transition-structure of the Groundwork in 
Ware (2016).
19.  We find a nearly identical set of claims in the second Critique, but there Kant speaks 
of an ‘archetypal world,’ which he says is a ‘model [Muster] for the determinations 
of our will’ (KpV, AA 5:43).
20.  One might be open to this claim but still wonder why such an ideal must be a 
recognizably moral one (as is the ‘Fact of Reason’) as opposed to a more generic 
ideal of rationality or agency. As an anonymous reviewer puts it: ‘Kant’s argument 
in Groundwork III might just be that once we appreciate the connections between 
morality, autonomy, and rationality, we can also see that moral acts are the only 
possible fully rational or intelligible or justified ones, or those in which our agency 
is most fully realized.’ The reason why I wish to insist upon calling the concept of 
an intelligible world a moral ideal is that it specifies practical laws that, in contrast 
to technical or prudential imperatives, express absolute necessity. Moreover, Kant 
himself is clear in the first Critique that the intelligible world is a moral ideal, so my 
reading has good textual support. As he states, the intelligible world is nothing 
more than the idea of the ‘world as it would be if it were in conformity with all 
moral laws’ (KrV A808/B836; see also Refl 5086 and 6977 dated from the 1770s). 
For an illuminating account of this passage in connection with Groundwork III, 
see Rauscher (2009; 2015).
21.  It is worth pointing out that when Kant introduces the concept of an intelligible 
world in Groundwork III, he says that a human being has ‘two standpoints from 
which he can regard himself and cognize [erkennen] laws for the use of his powers,’ 
by which he means to include our practical powers of will and volition (GMS, AA 
4:452). As members of the world of sense, Kant explains, we have a standpoint 
to consider ourselves ‘under laws of nature,’ but as members of the intelligible 
world, we have a standpoint to consider ourselves ‘under laws which, being 
independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in reason’ (GMS, 
AA 4:452; my emphasis). Since laws ‘grounded merely in reason’ are none other 
than the laws of morality (cf., GMS, AA 4:458 and 4:462), the implication of this 
passage is very similar to what Kant will assert in the second Critique: that our 
moral consciousness reveals our freedom of will.
22.  We find a similar claim in the second Critique: ‘Yet we are conscious through 
reason of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as if a natural order must at 
the same time arise from our will. This law must therefore be the idea of a nature 
not given empirically and yet possible through freedom, hence a supersensible 
nature to which we give objective reality at least in a practical respect, since we 
regard it as an object of our will as pure rational beings’ (KpV, AA 5:44; cf., KrV 
B430-31).
23.  At this ‘outermost boundary’ of practical inquiry, what remains beyond our 
epistemic reach is not the moral law’s conceptual structure. Kant had already 
clarified that structure in Groundwork II using a method of analysis. What remains 
‘incomprehensible’ then is the moral law’s normative authority. Interestingly, 
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Kant repeats this point in the second Critique when he explains why the moral 
law, unlike the pure categories of the understanding, admits of no justification: 
‘With the deduction [of the moral law], that is, the justification of its objective 
and universal validity and the discernment of the possibility of such a synthetic 
proposition a priori, one cannot hope to get on so well as was the case with the 
principles of the pure theoretical understanding’ (KpV, AA 5:46). See Baum (2014) 
for further discussion.
24.  My understanding of Kant’s second deduction has been influenced by 
Timmermann (2007) and Stern (2012; 2015), who both argue – correctly, I 
believe – that in this section of Groundwork III, Kant is only trying to explain the 
possibility of moral bindingness (i.e. the imperatival form the moral law takes to 
finite rational beings like us), not the moral law itself. For a helpful discussion of 
this distinction, i.e. between the moral law and its imperatival form, see Willaschek 
(1992, 176).
25.  Many commentators agree that Kant’s appeal to the idea of an intelligible world 
plays a crucial role in Groundwork III, but what they overlook is that this idea has 
two functions. When we consider ourselves as members of an intelligible world, 
we have grounds to ascribe a negative sense of freedom to ourselves since we 
are presupposing our independence from the world to which our impulses and 
inclinations belong, the world of sense. Yet, on my reading, this is not yet the 
key step. The key step is that the intelligible world also affords us a standpoint 
for thinking of ourselves in accordance with a pure practical law, i.e. the moral 
law. Only now do we have grounds to ascribe a positive sense of freedom to 
ourselves – to think of ourselves as possessing a will – since the moral law is 
self-legislated. Note, too, that at GMS, AA 4:458 Kant says that these two senses 
of freedom are ‘bound’ (verbunden) in the idea of an intelligible world, reiterating 
his earlier stipulation that synthetic propositions are ‘only possible by this, that 
both cognitions are bound [verbunden] together by their connection with a third, 
in which they are both to be found’ (GMS, AA 4:447; cf., KrV B162-65).
26.  Timmermann, for example, has argued that Kant’s mention of a ‘vainly sought 
deduction’ (vergeblich gesuchten Deduction) is a thinly veiled reference to 
Groundwork III: ‘Of course, Kant does not explicitly say that he is the person who 
tried in vain to provide a deduction of the moral principle, but as Groundwork III 
contains precisely such a deduction, and proving the possibility of the categorical 
imperative was hardly fashionable amongst his philosophical colleagues, we can 
safely infer that Kant had come to reject his earlier justificatory attempt by the 
time he composed the second Critique’ (2010, 74). On closer inspection, however, 
this assumption is far from self-evident. Just before Kant says that ‘something 
different and quite paradoxical takes the place of this [dieser] vainly sought 
deduction,’ he writes: ‘[T]he objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved 
by any deduction, by any efforts of theoretical reason, speculative or empirically 
supported’ (KpV, AA 5:47; my emphasis). This suggests Kant’s reference is quite 
general and does not necessarily imply his earlier argument. Given its placement 
in the text, the ‘vainly sought deduction’ is only a reproach against efforts to 
establish the validity of the moral law on theoretical grounds, i.e. the sort we 
find in the writings of Hobbes, Hutcheson, Wolff, or Crusius.
27.  Kant also echoes various turns of phrase from the last paragraph of Groundwork III 
when he writes: ‘But instead of the deduction of the supreme principle [obersten 
Princips] of pure practical reason – that is, the explanation of the possibility of 
such a cognition a priori – nothing more could be adduced than that, if one had 
insight into the possibility of freedom of an efficient cause, one would also have 
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insight into not merely the possibility but even the necessity of the moral law [ 
… ] But no insight can be had into the possibility of the freedom of an efficient 
cause, especially in the sensible world: we are fortunate [glücklich] if only we 
can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now 
forced [genöthigt] to assume it and are thereby justified in doing so by the moral 
law, which postulates it’ (KpV, AA 5:93–94).
28.  For an insightful discussion of these points, see Wood (2011). Schönecker defends 
a different reading, arguing that Kant is only speaking of justifying a ‘determinate 
formula’ of the moral principle, the project of Groundwork II (2013, 8, note 10). 
Yet, on examination, Kant’s remark proves to be ambiguous. When he speaks of 
justifying a ‘determinate formula’ of the moral principle, he could mean either (a) 
justifying the conceptual structure of the principle, or (b) justifying the principle’s 
application to us as a categorical imperative. I think (b) is a plausible reading, 
especially since Kant never characterizes the task of Groundwork I or II in terms 
of ‘Rechtfertigung’ (and elsewhere, when Kant invokes this particular term, he 
often addresses the synthetic application of a concept, not its mere analytic 
explication). That being said, even if Schönecker is right, Kant’s exclusion of 
Groundwork III from what the second Critique ‘presupposes’ does not offer direct 
support for the view that he abandoned his earlier strategy of justification. So 
even if we read Kant’s remark in terms of (a), further evidence is required to 
support the Reversal Reading.
29.  Aside from the passage at KpV, AA 5:8, there is only one other place in the second 
Critique where Kant alludes to his earlier strategy of justification. As rational 
beings, he writes, we can regard ourselves as members of an intelligible order, 
‘for it has been sufficiently proved elsewhere that freedom, if it is attributed to 
us, transfers us into an intelligible order of things’ (KpV, AA 5:42; my emphasis). 
Here, Kant is referring to Step 1 of his deduction from Groundwork III, that if we 
think of ourselves as free from external influences, we must take up a ‘different 
standpoint’ than when we ‘represent ourselves in terms of our actions as effects 
that we see before our eyes’ (GMS, AA 4:451). But we must ask: Why would Kant 
cite this step with approval in the second Critique? If he had reversed his structure 
of justification, consistency would have forced him to reject this earlier means 
of escaping the circle between freedom, autonomy, and morality. Instead of 
rejecting this move, though, we find Kant speaking of the doctrine of the Fact 
of Reason and his earlier strategy in the very same paragraph, as if the two were 
entirely compatible (KpV, AA 5:42).
30.  Kant’s motive for making the doctrine of the Fact of Reason prominent in the 
second Critique was perhaps a reaction to Tittel’s (1786). Kant replied to Tittel by 
saying: ‘A reviewer who wanted to say something censuring this work [i.e. the 
Groundwork] hit the mark better than he himself may have intended when he 
said that no new principle of morality is set forth in it but only a new formula. 
But who would even want to introduce a new principle of all morality and, as 
it were, first invent it? Just as if, before him, the world had been ignorant of 
what duty is or in thoroughgoing error about it’ (KpV, AA 5:8n). By stressing that 
our consciousness of the moral law is something actual – a ‘fact’ that precedes 
abstract speculation – Kant likely wanted to prevent other readers from confusing 
the formula of morality with morality itself, as Tittel did. It is also telling that the 
footnote at KpV, AA 5:8 appears just after Kant speaks of his earlier attempt to 
justify the formula of morality in Groundwork III.
31.  Kant continues: ‘Accordingly the moral law is for them an imperative that 
commands categorically because the law is unconditional; the relation of such 
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a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which signifies a 
necessitation [Nötigung], though only by reason and its objective law, to an action 
which is called duty’ (KpV, AA 5:32).
32.  As an anonymous reviewer points out, one might also suspect that the different 
titles Kant uses in Groundwork III and the second Critique reflect a deeper shift in his 
project. In the former work, he speaks of a ‘Critique of pure practical reason,’ only 
to claim in the latter work that we have ‘no need to criticize the pure faculty itself in 
order to see whether reason is merely making a claim in which it presumptuously 
oversteps itself’ (KpV, AA 5:3). Now this would indeed signal a major shift if Kant 
believed in Groundwork III that pure practical reason oversteps its boundaries 
(and so requires a ‘Critique’ in the negative sense of the word). However, when 
we turn to the details of the text, we find Kant speaking of a ‘Critique’ in the 
positive sense of the word, i.e. an examination of reason’s sources and limits (c.f., 
KrV A11/B25). These two senses of ‘Critique’ are also implicit in Kant’s account 
of why he introduced the ideal of an intelligible world in Groundwork III. That 
ideal, he writes, served merely to ‘limit the principle of motives from the field 
of sensibility by circumscribing this field and showing that it does not include 
everything within itself but that there is still more beyond it’ (GMS, AA 4:462; 
my emphasis). In other words, by curbing the pretensions of empirical practical 
reason (a negative Critique), Kant is able to show that practical reason has a pure 
use as well (a positive Critique). All of this coheres with his reasons for calling 
the second Critique a ‘Critique of practical reason.’ For a different reading, see 
Bojanowski (forthcoming).
33.  I thank an anonymous reviewer for formulating this objection.
34.  This shifts the burden of proof onto the standard reading. For if we assume that 
the ‘demonstrable proposition’ refers to the moral law’s supreme normative 
authority, then we are forced to say that Kant contradicts himself when (at GMS, 
AA 4:463) he claims that such authority lies beyond our epistemic reach.
35.  For further discussion of this passage, see Tenenbaum (2012); Saunders (2014); 
and Horn (2015).
36.  Ameriks (2003) and Guyer (2009), for example, have pursued a reading of 
Groundwork III along these lines.
37.  Another potential problem with this argument – noted first by Pistorius in his 
1786 review of the Groundwork – is that Kant appears to overstep the limits 
he places on human knowledge by resting his deduction of the categorical 
imperative on a noumenal claim: ‘[Kant] helps himself to his problematic concept 
of freedom, transfers us from the world of sense to the world of understanding 
and brings over from this completely unknown world [völlig unbekannten Welt] the 
grounds of the possibility and necessity of his categorical imperative’ (Pistorius 
1786a, 159; my emphasis; see also Pistorius 1786b, 16). For a helpful discussion 
of Pistorius’s charge and its potential impact on Kant, see Ludwig (2010; 2012). 
See also Schönecker (1999, 2006) and Guyer (2007) for recent reformulations 
of this line of criticism. While this topic deserves fuller treatment, I would here 
like to make one preliminary remark. Even if we agree that Kant was sensitive 
to Pistorius’s review, it remains an open question whether his reaction was (i) to 
rewrite the inner structure of his argument in 1788, or (ii) to change its point of 
focus. The fact that Kant was influenced by Pistorius does not by itself resolve 
this issue.
38.  In yet another important passage, Kant writes that the idea of freedom ‘is valid 
only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being that believes itself to 
be conscious of a will, i.e. of a capacity distinct from a mere faculty of desire 
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(namely, to determine itself to action as an intelligence, hence according to laws 
of reason independently of natural instincts’ (GMS, AA 4:459). What is noteworthy 
here is that Kant does not say the idea of freedom is valid for a being conscious 
of a capacity to think pure theoretical ideas. Nor does he say the idea is valid 
for a being conscious of a capacity to act according to prudential imperatives. 
Instead, Kant is careful to qualify his remark so that the idea of freedom is valid 
only for a being conscious of a capacity to act according to laws of reason, that 
is, according to moral laws.
39.  Cited from the English translation (1994, 80–81).
40.  1783 is the same year Kant published his Prolegomena, and in this work he 
draws an explicit link between freedom and the concept of an ‘ought’ (Prol, AA 
4:344–245).
41.  Some passages from the 1781 edition of the first Critique indicate that Kant had 
yet to appreciate the distinctive status of moral imperatives. At times, for instance, 
he talks as if our faculty of reason displays absolute spontaneity in all ‘ought’ 
statements, including prudential ones: ‘Whether it is an object of mere sensibility 
(the agreeable) or even of pure reason (the good), reason does not give in to those 
grounds which are empirically given, and it does not follow the order of things as 
they are presented in intuition, but with complete spontaneity it makes its own 
order according to ideas’ (KrV A547). However, following this passage, Kant goes 
on to say that by virtue of its ideas, reason ‘declares actions to be necessary that 
yet have not occurred and perhaps will not occur, nevertheless presupposing of 
all such actions that reason could have causality in relation to them.’ And later, 
he clarifies that the projected ‘order’ reason fashions for itself is that of a moral 
world, that is, a world of rational beings ‘insofar as their free choice under moral 
laws has thoroughgoing systematic unity in itself as well as with the freedom 
of everyone else’ (KrV A808/B836). In retrospect, Kant may have thought it was 
sufficient to point to practical imperatives in general to indicate a divide between 
what ‘is’ and what ‘ought’ to be, all the while knowing that only moral imperatives 
presuppose our complete spontaneity in the strict (i.e. transcendental) sense of 
the word. Thanks to Bernd Ludwig for pressing me on this issue.
42.  In addition to Puls (2014), the centrality of ‘common’ moral self-understanding 
is discussed in detail by Grenberg (2013), Ware (2014), and Sticker (2015) in 
connection with Kant’s Fact of Reason.
43.  As Kant states in the Preface of the Groundwork: ‘my aim here is actually directed 
to moral world-wisdom [sittliche Weltweisheit]’ (GMS, AA 4:389).
44.  The genesis of the second Critique bears out my hypothesis. In June 1787, Kant 
reported to be working on a new monograph titled a Critique of Practical Reason. 
In a letter to Friedrich Gottlob Born, he wrote: ‘This work will better demonstrate 
and make comprehensible the possibility of supplementing, by pure practical 
reason, that which I denied to speculative reason’ (Br, AA 10:490). Similarly, in 
a letter to Reinhold, dated at the end of December 1787, he wrote: ‘This little 
book will sufficiently resolve the many contradictions that the followers of the 
old-guard philosophy imagine they see in my Critique [of Pure Reason]’ (Br, AA 
10:513–16). For a superb discussion of this history, see Klemme (2010).
45.  I am thinking of Nagel (1970), Velleman (1989; 2009), and especially Korsgaard 
(1996a; 2009).
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